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Abstract
Business-owners often postpone disinvestment decisions even when future profits are not 
expected to compensate for current losses. We use an experiment to study one possible 
behavioral motivation. Studies in psychology suggest that making decisions is stressful and, 
consequently, many people prefer to buck-pass their decisions to someone else or to postpone 
them to future periods. Other people, however, are vigilant subjects that are able to make 
efficient decisions. In our experiment, we measure subjects’ buck-passing, vigilance and risk-
aversion traits and study their performance in games in which they have to make investment 
and disinvestment decisions. We find that the number of rounds most subjects play is greater 
than the number expected by real-option theory but that vigilant and risk-averse subjects tend 
to make decisions that are more efficient than all other subjects, that vigilant but not risk-
averse subjects tend to shirk making the investment decisions and that buck-passing and not 
risk-averse subjects tend to postpone their disinvestment decisions even when they make 
losses that would have induced most other subjects to disinvest. 
Keywords:  buck-passing, conflict theory of decision making, disinvestment decisions, 
economic experiment, optimal stopping, player types, risk aversion, 
vigilance.
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Zusammenfassung
Unternehmer sind dafür bekannt, Desinvestitionsentscheidungen zu verschieben, auch wenn 
die Erwartung über zukünftige Gewinne nicht ausreicht, um die derzeitigen Verluste zu 
kompensieren. Wir führen eine experimentelle Studie durch, um einen möglichen Treiber 
dieses Verhaltens besser zu verstehen. Psychologische Studien zeigen, dass das Treffen von 
Entscheidungen mit Stress verbunden sein kann, und dass viele Menschen daher eine Neigung 
haben, entweder andere ihre Entscheidungen treffen zu lassen oder diese auf zukünftige 
Perioden zu verschieben. Andere Personen sind dagegen wachsam und dazu in der Lage, 
effizient zu entscheiden. In unserem Experiment messen wir die Tendenz von Personen, ihre 
Entscheidungen zu verschieben bzw. wachsam zu sein sowie deren Risikobereitschaft und 
beobachten, wie gut diese in Spielen abschneiden, in denen sie Investitions- und Desinvesti-
tionsentscheidungen treffen müssen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die meisten Personen 
mehr Runden spielen, als dies auf Basis der Realoptionstheorie erklärt werden kann, dass aber 
zugleich wachsame und risikoaverse Personen Entscheidungen treffen, die näher an eine 
effiziente Entscheidung herankommen als die anderer Personen. Wir zeigen weiterhin, dass 
wachsame, aber nicht risikoaverse Personen dazu neigen, die Investitionsentscheidung gar 
nicht erst zu treffen (d.h., die Teilnahme an dem Spiel zu vermeiden), und dass verschiebende 
und nicht risikoaverse Personen dazu neigen, ihre Desinvestitionsentscheidungen auch dann 
spät zu treffen, wenn sie Verluste machen, bei denen andere längst mit dem Spiel aufgehört 
hätten.
Schlüsselwörter: Buck-passing (Entscheidungsverschiebungsneigung), Konflikttheorie der 
Entscheidung, Desinvestitionsentscheidungen, ökonomisches Experiment, 
optimal stopping, Spielertypen, Risikoneigung, Vigilance (Wachsamkeit)
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1 Introduction 
When a decision has irreversible outcomes, it is often advisable to postpone it until more 
information becomes available. For example, land owners that contemplate selling their assets 
can often gain from waiting until market conditions improve. Entrepreneurs can often gain 
from waiting before closing losing businesses because demand sometimes increases over time 
(Titman, 1985, Brennan and Schwartz, 1985, McDonald and Siegel, 1986, Dixit, 1991, Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994, Weeds, 2002). 
Decisions, however, are often postponed even when waiting is unlikely to be profitable. For 
example, Madrian and Shea (2001) find that new employees often lose significant sums 
because they postpone signing 401(k) schemes and Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) 
report evidence suggesting that members of health clubs do not cancel their subscriptions long 
after they stop to practice.  
Research in psychology suggests that a possible explanation for these postponements is the 
mental costs of the decision making process (Thaler, 1981, O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 
2001, Angeletos et al., 2001, Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). According to the theory of 
decision making, most subjects face stress when they have to make a decision (Janis and 
Mann, 1977, Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Some subjects have the ability to handle this 
stress efficiently and, therefore, these subjects usually execute their decisions at the most 
appropriate times. Janis and Mann (1977) define such subjects as vigilant. Most subjects, 
however, often do not handle the cognitive stress efficiently.  
Procrastinators are subjects that cannot efficiently handle the stress when the decisions 
involve instantaneous costs and future benefits. Procrastinator students, for example, often do 
not start writing assignments until the last moment, although they could probably improve 
their grades by starting earlier. Procrastinator employees often do not save enough for 
retirement because they prefer current consumption over future one (Thaler, 1981, 1984, 
Akerlof, 1991, Lowenstein and Prelec, 1992, O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001, Angeletos 
et al., 2001, Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002, Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004, Della Vigna and 
Malmendier, 2004, Grenadier and Wang, 2007).  
Buck-passers also tend to postpone decisions, but they postpone the decisions because they 
are afraid of giving up on alternatives and not because they prefer immediate outcomes over 
future outcomes (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Buck-passers therefore tend to postpone 
decisions when choosing one alternative implies giving up on other alternatives, especially 
when several of the alternatives seem similarly attractive. For example, a buck-passer that has 
to choose between two models is likely to postpone his decision even if he were to buy any of 
the models if it was offered on its own (Shafrir et al., 1993).
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Janis and Mann (1977) suggest that in addition to personality traits such as vigilance, 
procrastination and buck-passing, decision making also depends on risk perceptions. When 
the outcomes of a decision are perceived as risky, the decision maker is more likely to process 
all the relevant information than when the outcomes are perceived as involving a low risk. It 
can be expected, therefore, that risk-averse subjects will be more likely to process relevant 
information before making or postponing a decision than other subjects because risk-averse 
subjects are more likely to perceive a given decision as risky. 
In the next sections, we report the results of an experiment that tested the effects of the 
interactions between risk-aversion, buck-passing, and vigilance on the postponement of 
decisions. The experiment began with an investment stage that was followed by a game stage. 
In the game the subjects needed to make a series of disinvestment decisions and in most 
cases, the games had a positive expected value. The positive expected value depended, 
however, on the disinvestment decisions and failing to disinvest in time could have cost 
significant shares of the payoffs. Sandri et al. (2010) show that in a similar scenario, most 
subjects tended to postpone their disinvestment decisions although the postponement cost 
them significant sums. They also show that there were significant differences between 
individuals’ tendencies to disinvest earlier or later and that those differences cannot be 
explained by differences in risk aversion only. We extend their findings by providing 
evidence that some of the differences can be explained by dividing subjects into types
according to their scores in vigilance, buck-passing and risk-aversion tests.  
Subjects that were both risk-averse and vigilant usually chose to invest and they also made 
better disinvestment decisions than all the other subjects. Subjects that were vigilant but not 
risk-averse were more likely than other subjects to give up on the investment opportunity. 
When they did invest, however, vigilant but not risk-averse subjects tended to postpone their 
disinvestment decisions even when this postponement cost them significant sums. All other 
subjects usually invested and then postponed their disinvestment decisions. Consequently, 
these subjects earned less than risk-averse and vigilant subjects. The subjects that made the 
smallest profits were subjects that had both high scores of buck-passing and low scores of 
risk-aversion.
The combination of an economic experiment and psychological personality scales therefore 
provides results that can assist in the better understanding of individuals’ timing of decisions. 
The results may therefore be useful in predicting the timing of decisions which have 
irreversible outcomes, such as decisions on investment, disinvestment, purchase, savings and 
education.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the methodology and 
the data. In section 3 we present the theoretical background and our hypotheses. In section 4 
we present our results and we conclude in section 5. 
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2 Data and Methodology 
The settings of our experiment are based on Sandri et al. (2011). The experiment was fully 
computerized and conducted at a computer lab in a major German university. The participants 
were 85 students and non-students that were recruited via the university's internet site. Each 
subject participated in one of seven sessions and the number of subjects in each session was 
between 7 and 14. All the sessions were conducted in one week in November 2010. 
Each subject participated in one of two treatments. The first treatment was a compound-
interest treatment and the second was a decreasing-interest treatment. In both treatments, 
subjects received a show up fee of 18,000 points. The exchange rate was 6000 points for one 
Euro.1.
Before starting the experiment, the subjects read the instructions and then answered several 
questions that tested their understanding. When all the subjects completed answering all the 
questions correctly, each subject played one practice game. The practice game was followed 
by six games that counted for the payoff.2
The settings in the compound-interest treatments were as follows. Each of the six games was 
composed of an investment-opportunity stage and a game stage. In the investment-opportunity 
stages, each subject received information about the investment's cost, about the possible 
profits in the game stage and about the profits if he decides not to invest. The subject then 
decided whether he pays the investment-cost and plays the game or does not invest and skips 
the game.  
The investment's cost was either 10,000 or 15,000 points. If a subject chose to skip an 
investment opportunity, he earned a payoff that was composed of the initial endowment of 
18,000 points plus 10% per round interest on the cost, accumulated over 11 rounds. Thus, 
when the cost was 10,000 points, a subject that skipped the investment opportunity received 
18,000 + 10,000×(1.111 – 1) = 36,531 points. When the cost was 15,000 points, a subject that 
skipped the investment opportunity received 18000 + 15,000×(1.111 – 1) = 45,797 points. 
If a subject chose to invest, he paid the investment's cost and played the game. The game was 
composed of up to 11 rounds. In the beginning of the first round, a subject that chose to invest 
received a first-round-prize which was either 1,000 or 1,500 points. The subject had then to 
choose between continuing to the next round and disinvesting. If he chose to disinvest he 
received a disinvestment-prize which was either 11,000 or 16,000 points. The subject also 
received a 10% per round interest on the disinvestment-prize and on the first-round prize, 
accumulated over the ten rounds left to play. 
                                                          
1  At the time of the experiment, 1 Euro was equivalent to about 1.42 US Dollars. 
2  We used Z-Tree to program the experiment (Fischbacher, 1999, 2007). 
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If the subject chose to continue, he proceeded to the second round. In the second round he 
received the second round-prize which, with 50% probability, was greater than the first-round 
prize and with 50% probability was smaller than the first-round prize. The subject then chose 
whether he continues to the next round or disinvests. If he disinvested, he received the 
disinvestment prize, the prizes he accumulated in the first and second rounds and 10% interest 
per round on these sums, accumulated over the nine rounds left to play. If the subject chose to 
continue, he proceeded to the third round. In the third round the subject again received the 
round's prize, which was again either greater, with 50% probability, or smaller, with 50% 
probability than the prize in the second round. The subject then had to choose whether he 
continues to the next round or disinvests, and so forth. The game ended when the subject 
chose to disinvest or when the subject reached the end of the 11th round. When the game 
ended, the subject received the disinvestment prize, the prizes he accumulated in all the 
rounds he played and a 10% interest per round on this sum, accumulated over the rounds left 
to play.
The size by which the rounds' prizes changed between every two consecutive rounds was 
determined by the game's variance. In half of the games, the variance was 200 points and in 
the other half it was 1,000 points. Thus, when the first round's prize was 1,000 points and the 
variance was 200 points, the second round's prize was either 1,200 or 800 points. If the 
second round's prize turned out to be 1,200 points, then the third round's prize could either be 
1,000 points or 1,400 points. When the second round's prize was 800 points then the third 
round's prize could either be 600 or 1,000 points and so forth.
Before each round, the subjects received a table that depicted the information on possible 
prizes and the probabilities in a table form. Figures 1 and 2 are examples of such tables that 
were seen by a specific subject in the first and second rounds that he played, respectively. 
Table 1 shows all the prizes the subject could have won in each of the rounds between the 1st
and until the 11th. The parentheses below each prize give all the probability of winning that 
prize. For example, the table shows that the probability of winning 1,200 points in the second 
round was 50% and the probability of winning 1,400 points in the third round was 25%. 
Figure 2 is shows the information presented to the subject in the second round. The second 
round prize was 1,200 points and, therefore, the subject's probability of winning 1,400 points 
in the third round increased to 50% and his probability of winning 600 points in the third 
round decreased to zero. Consequently, the option of winning 600 points in the third round 
does not appear in Table 2. 
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Figure 1.  Screenshot of payoffs and probabilities in round 1 
Source: own calculations 
Figure 2.  Screenshot of payoffs and probabilities in round 2,  
given high payoff in round 1 
Source: own calculations
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Table 1 summarizes the parameters of the various games. The table also gives the trigger-
prizes, the expected number of rounds that a subject is expected to play and the expected 
payoffs. We find the trigger-prizes by backwards induction, as suggested by real options 
theory. The trigger-prizes of each round are, therefore, the minimum prizes that make a risk-
neutral subject indifferent between continuing and disinvesting. (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
The expected number of rounds was calculated by finding the probability that a subject will 
play each number of rounds before the prizes he wins drop below the trigger prizes. The 
expected profits were similarly calculated by finding the probability that the subject will win 
each prize, contingent on the rounds' prizes remaining greater than the trigger prizes.  
The settings in the decreasing-interest treatment were identical to those in the compound-
interest treatment, with the difference that in the decreasing-interest treatment, the subjects 
were informed that the disinvestment-prize will decrease by 10% for each round they choose 
to play. The disinvestment-prize in the first round, however, was the same as the disinvest-
ment-prize including interest in the compound-interest treatment. Thus, the compound-interest 
and the decreasing-interest treatments were normatively identical, but in the compound-
interest treatment the framing was of interest gains whereas in the decreasing-interest treat-
ment the framing was of interest-loses. 
After all the subjects finished playing the six games, they filled a Holt and Laury (2002) test 
for risk aversion. When all the subjects completed the Holt and Laury (2002) test, the 
computer picked one of the rounds at random and each subject was paid according to his 
payoffs in that round. The average payoff, including the show-up fee and the prizes for the 
Holt and Laury (2002) test was 9.50€.
All the subjects also completed a short questionnaire on their demographic and social-
economic characteristics and a test on their patterns of decision making. The decision-making 
test was a German translation of the vigilance and the buck-passing scales developed in Mann 
et al. (1997). Each of the two scales is composed of six statements such as “I try to find the 
disadvantages of all the alternatives” and “I do not make decisions unless I really have to.” 
For each of the 12 statements, each subject indicated how much he agrees or disagrees with 
the statement on a five point scale that went from fully agree (2) to fully disagree (-2). We 
find that the Cronbach alphas of both the buck-passing and the vigilance items are satisfactory 
and similar to those reported in Mann et al. (1997). The Cronbch alpha for the vigilance scale 
in our sample is 0.85 compared to 0.80 in Mann et al. (1997) and the Cronbach alpha for the 
buck-passing scale is 0.82 compared to 0.87 in Mann et al. (1997). We also find that, as 
predicted, the two scales are negatively correlated (r= -0.17, p< 0.01). We therefore use the 
average of each subject's responses on the six buck-passing items as the subject's buck-
passing score and the average of each subject's responses on the six vigilance items as the 
subject's vigilance score.  
Table 2 reports the subjects’ summary statistics. The average age of the subjects is 27.8 and 
about 76% of them are students. Out of the students, about 14% study economics or business. 
The data suggests that subjects tend to report themselves as relatively high on the vigilance 
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scale and relatively low on the buck passing scale. The average vigilance index is 0.79 and the 
average buck-passing index is -0.59. We define a subject's CRRA score as the CRRA 
coefficient that satisfies the subject’s pattern of choices in the Holt and Laury (2002) test.3
Negative scores therefore indicate that the subjects are risk-loving, zero indicates risk-neutral 
subjects and positive scores indicate that the subjects are risk-averse. The average CRRA 
score is 0.84, suggesting that most subjects in our sample are risk averse for the level of prizes 
offered in the experiment. 
Table 2.  Subjects’ summary statistics 
% Men 47.1% 
% Born in Germany 81.1% 
Average age 27.84 (SD: 7.646) 
% Non Students 23.6% 
% Business and Economics Students 10.5% 
CRRA Index 0.86 (SD: 0.476) 
Vigilance Index 0.84 (SD: 0.737) 
Buck-Passing Index -0.59 (SD: 0.789) 
Number of subjects 85 
Source: own calculations 
3 Theory and Hypotheses 
Janis and Mann (1977) conflict theory of decision making suggests that subjects often face 
significant stress before making a decision because they are not sure which of the alternative 
will yield the greatest benefit (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Some subjects have the ability 
to handle this stress efficiently. Such subjects tend to process all the relevant information and, 
consequently, they usually choose the alternative that has the greatest expected benefit and 
execute it at the most appropriate time. Such subjects are known as vigilant.
Many subjects, however, do not handle the stress that they face when making a decision 
efficiently. Consequently, many subjects postpone their decisions because by postponing choice 
they avoid giving up on the other alternatives. Such subjects are known as buck-passers. Buck-
passers, therefore, often postpone decisions when the decisions require choosing between 
several alternative that are all similarly attractive or similarly unattractive. For example, Buck-
                                                          
3  About 18% of the subjects made more than one switch between the “safe” and the “risky” gambles in the 
Holt and Laury (2002) test. In these cases, we calculated the subjects’ risk aversion according to the last 
switch from the safe to risky option that they made, thus giving these subjects the maximum risk aversion 
score implied by their responses. Dropping these subjects from the sample does not change our main results. 
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passers often postpone purchase decisions when a few of the models offered are similarly 
attractive (Shafrir et al., 1993). It also seems likely that buck-passing is one of the reason that 
subject hesitate before signing a 401(k) contract (Madrian and Shea, 2001).
In many situations, it is difficult to isolate the effects of buck-passing on the decision making 
because there are often several reasons for postponing decisions. Many subjects, for example, 
procrastinate before making a decision because they prefer current benefits over future ones, 
and therefore they tend to choose the alternative that gives the maximum immediate benefits 
and minimum immediate costs (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001, Angeletos et al., 2001, 
Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002, Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004, Della Vigna and Malmendier, 
2004). Procrastination and buck-passing are often correlated and, therefore, it is often difficult 
to separate the effect of the two motives. For example, subjects that postpone signing a saving 
scheme might do so because they hesitate before choosing one scheme and giving up on the 
others, because they prefer current consumption over future consumption or because of a 
combination of the two motives (Madrian and Shea, 2001). To test the effects of vigilance and 
buck-passing on the postponement of decisions we therefore conducted a lab-test. In the lab-
test, the subjects faced an investment decision followed by a series of disinvestment decisions. 
We made all the subjects start the experiment and end it in the same time and, therefore, the 
subjects had no incentive to procrastinate because they could not influence the timing of the 
costs, the cognitive effort in making the decisions, or the timing of receiving the monetary 
benefits. In our lab-test, therefore, the subjects had only a buck-passing incentive to delay 
their disinvestment decisions because by disinvestment implies giving up on the opportunity 
to continue.
Sandri et al. (2011) find that in a setting similar to ours, most subjects tend to postpone their 
disinvestment decisions even when the postponement costs them significant loses. They also 
find that there is significant variation across individuals with some subjects seeming more 
inclined to postpone their decisions than the average subject and some subjects more inclined 
to disinvest in one of the early rounds. Based on psychological findings, we predict that the 
number of rounds played will be correlated with the subjects' scores of vigilance, buck-
passing and risk-aversion. We expect that vigilant subjects were more likely than other 
subjects not to postpone the disinvestment decision whereas buck-passers tended to postpone 
disinvestment decisions even when the postponement cost them significant sum. 
In addition, Janis and Mann (1977) suggest that subjects are more likely to process information 
when they perceive the outcomes as risky, whereas they tend to economize on cognitive 
resources when they believe that their choices will not significantly affect the outcomes. We 
therefore expect that in addition to subjects' buck-passing and vigilance traits, the subjects' 
disinvestment decisions will also depend on their risk-aversion scores because we expect that 
risk-averse subjects were more likely than other subjects to perceive the outcomes as risky. 
We therefore define five groups of subjects. Risk-averse vigilant subjects are those subjects 
that have above average scores in both the vigilance and the Holt and Laury (2002) risk-
aversion tests. Risk-normal vigilant subjects are those subjects that have above average scores 
10 Christian Schade and Avichai Snir 
SiAg-Working Paper 13 (2012); HU Berlin
in the vigilance test but below average scores in the risk-aversion test. Risk-averse buck-
passing subjects are those subjects that have above average scores in both the buck-passing 
and the Holt and Laury (2002) risk-aversion tests. Risk-normal buck-passing subjects are 
those subjects that received above average scores in the buck-passing test but below average 
scores in the risk-aversion test. All other subjects compose our control group.  
By studying the disinvestment decisions of the members of each of these groups relative to 
the decisions of members of the other groups, we attempt to contribute to understanding the 
effects of personality traits on economic outcomes. By studying the effects of buck-passing 
and vigilance on behavior, we may assist, for example, to identify the personality traits that 
make some subjects behave like rational agents whereas others buck-pass. Our results may 
therefore assist in predicting economic behavior and outcomes in environments where some 
of the agents have bounded rationality (Thaler, 1984, 1991, Angeletos et al., 2001, Grenadier 
and Wang, 2007). 
4 Results 
4.1 Probability of skipping a game 
The first decision that each subject had to make in each of the six games that he played was 
whether or not he invests. Subjects that invested continued to play the disinvestment games 
and those that chose not to invest skipped the disinvestment games. Columns 1, 3 and 5 in 
Table 3 provide summary statistics on the likelihood that a subject skipped a game. We find 
that 11.2% of the games in the compound-interest treatment and 0% of the games in the 
negative-interest treatment were skipped. The difference is statistically significant (ANOVA 
F=22.7, p<0.01). It seems that the subjects skipped games in the compound-interest treatment 
but not in the decreasing-interest treatment because in the decreasing-interest treatment the 
disinvestment-prize was framed as a large sum whereas in the compound-interest treatments 
the disinvestment-prize was framed as a smaller sum plus interest. It seems that, consequently, 
subjects in the decreasing-interest treatments were less willing to skip than subjects in the 
compound-interest treatment because they were less willing to give up on the disinvestment-
prize than subjects in the compound-interest treatment. 
We also find that subjects in the compound-interest treatment were marginally more likely to 
skip losing games and high variance games than they were likely to skip other games. The 
ANOVA F of the interaction between the compound-interest and the type of games is 1.84 
(p<0.10).These results therefore suggest that there were at least some subjects that tended to 
make their investment decisions on the basis of the expected returns and on the basis of the 
perceived risk.
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The order of the games, however, did not seem to affect the investment decisions. The  
F-statistics for the order of the games and for the interaction between the order of the games 
and the type of treatment are both statistically insignificant (F=0.61, p>0.10 and F=0.89,
p>0.10, respectively). The results therefore suggest that the subjects did not draw conclusions 
from one type of game to the others. 
Thus, the results so far indicate that there were some differences between the likelihoods that 
subjects skipped games, and that these differences were correlated with the games’ parameters. 
To test whether the investment decisions were also affected by subjects' personality traits and 
risk aversion we estimated a random effects Probit model on the likelihood that a subject 
skipped a game. The dependent variable is a skip-game dummy that equals 1 if a subject 
chose to skip a game and 0 if he chose to play.  
To estimate the effect of the interactions between buck-passing, vigilance and risk-aversion 
we include in the regression four dummy variables. The first equals one if a subject is risk-
averse-vigilant and zero otherwise. The second equals one if a subject is risk-normal-vigilant
and zero otherwise. The third equals one if a subject is a risk-averse-buck-passer and 0 other-
wise. The fourth equals one if a subject is a risk-normal-buck-passer and zero otherwise.
We also include in the regression controls for the games' attributes and for subjects' socio-
demographic characteristics. As control for the games' attributes we include the cost which 
was either 10,000 or 15,000 points, the disinvestment-prize which was either 11,000 or 16,000 
points, the variance which was either 200 or 1,000 points, the first-prize which was either 
1,000 or 1,500 points and a dummy that equals 1 if the trial is a decreasing-interest-trial and  
0 if the trial is in a compound-interest trial. As controls for subjects' socio-demographic 
characteristics we include the subjects' age, a man dummy that equals 1 if a subject is a man 
and 0 if he is a woman, a student dummy that equals 1 if a subject is a student and 0 otherwise 
and a German-born dummy that equals 1 if a subject was born in Germany and 0 otherwise. 
We expect that a high investment cost will increase the likelihood that a subject skipped a 
game and that high disinvestment-prizes and high first-prizes will decrease the likelihood that 
a subject will skip a trial. At the same time, we do not have a prediction for the effect of the 
variance because the theory of real-options suggests that an increase in the variance increases 
the expected payoffs but it also increases the perceived riskiness. The results are summarized 
in the first column of Table 4.  
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Table 4. The likelihood that a subject skipped a game 
Dependent Variable Skip-game 
 All games Only positive-treatment-games 
 1 2 3 4 
Risk-averse-vigilant 0.50 
(0.370) 
0.50 
(0.370) 
0.50 
(0.370) 
0.50 
(0.370) 
Risk-normal-vigilant 0.71** 
(0.347) 
0.71** 
(0.347) 
0.71** 
(0.347) 
0.71** 
(0.347) 
Risk-averse-buck-passers 0.13 
(0.388) 
0.13 
(0.388) 
0.13 
(0.388) 
0.13 
(0.388) 
Risk-normal-buck-passers 0.17 
(0.335) 
0.17 
(0.335) 
0.17 
(0.335) 
0.17 
(0.335) 
Cost-of-playing 0.0002** 
(0.00008) 
0.0002** 
(0.00008) 
Disinvestment-prize 0.0001 
(0.00009) 
 0.0001 
(0.00009) 
Difference between  
disinvestment-prize and  
cost-of-playing 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Variance -0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0003) 
First-prize -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.0007) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.0007) 
Negative-treatment -5.85 
(4056.059) 
-5.85 
(4056.059) 
Age 0.002 
(0.021) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
Men 0.51* 
(0.294) 
0.51* 
(0.294) 
0.51* 
(0.294) 
0.51* 
(0.294) 
Student 0.49 
(0.431) 
0.49 
(0.431) 
0.49 
(0.431) 
German-born 0.20 
(0.310) 
0.20 
(0.306) 
0.20 
(0.306) 
0.20 
(0.306) 
Skip-optimal 1.32* 
(0.727) 
1.32* 
(0.727) 
Constant -4.72*** 
(1.410) 
-4.72*** 
(1.410) 
-4.72*** 
(1.410) 
-4.72*** 
(1.410) 
Observations 510 510 264 510 
Ȥ2 12.91 12.91 12.91 12.91 
*- p<0.10 **- p<0.05 ***- p<0.001 
Source: own calculations 
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We find that risk-normal-vigilant subjects have a significantly greater likelihood of skipping 
games than all the other subjects. For example, the probability that a German born 27.8 years 
old male student that is not vigilant will skip a low-variance-low-first-prize game is 3.0%. 
The probability that a risk-normal-vigilant subject with the same characteristics will skip a 
low-variance-low-first-prize game is 12.2%, more than four times greater. At the same time, 
risk-averse-vigilant subjects, risk-averse buck-passers and risk-normal buck-passers have 
probabilities of skipping a game that are not statistically different than those of all the other 
subjects.
Assuming that the subjects made decisions to maximize their payoffs, it therefore seems that 
risk-normal-vigilant subjects had different expectations about their payoffs from playing than 
other subjects. Whereas both risk-averse vigilant subjects and all the other subjects seem to 
have expected that they will gain more by playing than by skipping, risk-normal-vigilant 
subjects seem to have been more doubtful about their ability to profit from playing. A 
possible explanation is that risk-normal subjects often expected that they will not process all 
the information in every round because the effect of each disinvestment decision on the 
payoff is small and, therefore, subjects that are not risk-averse are likely to expect that they 
will not consider the disinvestment decision in each round as risky. Only subjects that are 
vigilant, however, are likely to follow through on this expectation and skip the games, because 
non-vigilant subjects are likely to find it cognitively stressful to give up on the opportunity to 
play.
Besides vigilance and risk-aversion, the coefficients of the controls suggest that the probability 
of skipping games mainly depends on the investment cost. When the cost increases, all subjects 
become significantly more likely to quit. The variance, the initial-prize and the disinvestment-
prize, on the other hand, do not seem to have significant effects on the likelihood that subjects 
skip games. 4
To test the robustness of our results on the effects of risk-aversion and vigilance, we 
conducted several robustness checks. The second column of Table 3 reports the results when 
we add to the regression a skipping-is-optimal dummy that equals 1 if a game is skipped that 
is a losing-game and 0 otherwise. Because skipping-is-optimal is linearly correlated with the 
costs and the disinvestment-prizes, we replace the cost and disinvestment-prize variables in 
this regression by the difference between the disinvestment-prizes and the costs.  
We find that the coefficient of skipping-is-optimal is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that subjects were more likely to skip losing games than all other games. 5 The 
                                                          
4  These results should be interpreted with some caution because in our settings the costs are strongly correlated 
with the first round’s prizes and the disinvestment-prizes. The inclusion or the removal of some or all of 
these controls does not significantly affect, however, the coefficient of risk-normal vigilant subjects.  
5  We also interacted the skipping-is-optimal dummy with the dummies for risk-averse-vigilant, risk-normal-
vigilant, risk-averse-buck-passers and risk-normal-buck-passers. The coefficients of all the interaction variables 
were statistically insignificant. 
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effect of risk-normal-vigilant subjects, however, remains negative and significant. Thus, the 
results suggest that even after controlling for games in which the expected payoffs were 
smaller than the payoffs from skipping, risk-normal vigilant subjects are more likely to skip 
games than all other subjects.  
Columns 3-4 summarize the results of repeating the two regressions using only observations 
on games in the compound-interest treatments. This has no effect on any of the results. 
4.2 Rounds played until quitting 
Each subject that chose to invest continued to the first round of the game.  Before each round, 
the subject received information about the prizes he won so far, about the prize he won in the 
current round and about the possible prizes he could win in the following rounds. The subject 
then had to choose whether he continues or disinvests. Real options theory suggests that the 
optimal strategy for a risk-neutral subject is to disinvest in the first round in which the round’s 
prize drops below the disinvestment trigger.  The conflict theory of decision making, however, 
predicts that subjects face stress when making a disinvestment decision because disinvestment 
implies giving up on the option to continue playing. We therefore expect that subjects that 
cannot handle this stress efficiently will continue to play even when the expected payoffs 
from playing are smaller than the profits from disinvesting (Janis and Mann, 1977, Mann et 
al., 1997).
We test this prediction by estimating a semi parametric Cox proportional hazard model on the 
likelihood that a subject will disinvest. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a 
subject disinvested in the given round and 0 if he continued to the consecutive round. We use 
robust standard errors and we cluster the observations by subject. To test our main hypothesis 
we include in the regression dummies for risk-averse-vigilant subjects, risk-normal-vigilant
subjects, risk-averse-buck-passers and risk-normal-buck-passers, defined as above.
We also include controls for the games' attributes and the subjects’ characteristics. As controls 
for the games' attribute we include the cost, the disinvestment-prize, the round’s-payoff, the 
variance and a negative-treatment-dummy. As controls for subjects' characteristics we include, 
as in the previous subsection, the subjects' age a dummy for male subjects, a dummy for 
students, and a dummy for subjects that were born-in-Germany.
Real options theory predicts that the disinvestment-prize will have a negative effect on the 
number of rounds played because when the disinvestment-prize increases from 11,000 to 
16,000, the 10% interest on continuing to the next round increases from 1,100 per round to 
1,600 points per round. In addition, we expect that subjects usually do not quit when they 
receive a large round's payoff and that, consequently, the rounds' payoffs will have a positive 
effect on the likelihood that a subject will continue to the consecutive round. 
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Table 5. The likelihood of disinvestment 
 1 2 3 
Risk-averse-vigilant 0.26* 
(0.137) 
0.24* 
(0.135) 
0.26* 
(0.137) 
Risk-normal-vigilant -0.02 
(0.123) 
-0.02 
(0.122) 
-0.02 
(0.122) 
Risk-averse-buck-passers -0.02 
(0.153) 
-0.02 
(0.151) 
-0.02 
(0.152) 
Risk-normal-buck-passers -0.11 
(0.127) 
-0.12 
(0.126) 
-0.11 
(0.126) 
Cost-of-playing -0.000005 
(0.00001) 
0.00001 
(0.00001) 
Disinvestment-prize 0.00006*** 
(0.00002) 
Variance -0.00001 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Rounds' prize -0.00004 
(0.0003) 
-0.00003 
(0.00002) 
Trigger-prize 0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
Minimum possible prize   -0.00004** 
(0.00002) 
Maximum possible prize 0.000009 
(0.00002) 
Negative-treatment -0.22** 
(0.111) 
-0.23** 
(0.109) 
-0.22** 
(0.111) 
Age -0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
Men -0.02 
(0.096) 
-0.03 
(0.095) 
-0.03 
(0.096) 
Student -0.07 
(0.137) 
-0.07 
(0.138) 
-0.07 
(0.136) 
German-born -0.12 
(0.117) 
-0.12 
(0.114) 
-0.13 
(0.114) 
Observations 3510 3510 3510 
Ȥ2 33.0*** 24.8*** 30.2*** 
*- p<0.10 **- p<0.05 ***- p<0.01
Source: own calculations  
As above, we do not have predictions about the coefficient of variance because an increase in 
the variance increases the perceived risk but it also increases the expected payoffs for a player 
that expects to disinvest in time. If subjects are not affected by framing biases, then the 
negative-treatment dummy should have no effect on the probability of disinvesting because the 
negative-interest and the compound-interest treatments are normatively the same. However, 
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we include the negative-treatment dummy in the regression because in the compound-interest 
treatment, the disinvestment-prizes are presented as constant over the rounds and only the 
interest payoffs decrease with every passing round whereas in the negative-interest treatment, 
the disinvestment-prizes themselves decrease with every passing round. We therefore include 
the negative-treatment dummy in the regression to control for the possibility that the 
differences in the framing had an effect on the subject's disinvestment decisions. The results 
are summarized in the first column of Table 5.  
Ceteris paribus, it seems that in every round, risk-averse-vigilant subjects are more likely to 
disinvest than other subjects whereas risk-normal vigilant subjects, risk-averse buck-passers, 
risk-normal buck-passers and subjects in the baseline group seem to have similar probabilities 
of disinvestment. Figure 3 depicts this result graphically. For each round, the solid line 
depicts the probability that a risk-averse-vigilant subject will quit and the dashed line depicts 
the probability that subjects that are not risk-averse and vigilant will quit. The differences 
between the solid and the dashed lines suggest that for every round, the probability that a risk-
averse-vigilant will quit is about 5% - 10% greater than the probability that other subjects will 
quit. Thus, for example, if the game is a compound interest low-variance-low-first-prize
game, the expected number of rounds that a 27.8 German born student that is not risk-averse-
vigilant is expected to play is 8.4. A risk-averse-vigilant subject with the same characteristics,
on the other hand, is expected to play 6.6 rounds, 21% less than the not risk-averse-vigilant 
subject.
Figure 3. Probability of quitting 
Source: own calculations 
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Thus, the results suggest that only subjects that are both vigilant and risk-averse tend to 
disinvest early whereas other subjects tend to play a significantly greater number of rounds. It 
therefore seems that vigilance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for early disinvestment. 
A possible explanation is that risk-averse subjects tend to perceive the decision in every round 
as risky whereas other subjects tend to believe that disinvesting in the current round will not 
have a large effect on their payoffs relative to disinvesting in the consecutive round. Thus, 
risk-averse subjects were more likely to process all the relevant information than other 
subjects. Consequently, risk-averse subjects were more likely than other subjects to recognize 
when a round’s prize dropped below the disinvestment trigger. Only subjects that were also 
vigilant, however, were also likely to follow through on their decision and disinvest because 
non vigilant subject were likely to face too much stress when they had to execute an early 
disinvestment decision. 
The coefficients of the other controls seem to suggest that, as predicted above, the effect of 
the disinvestment-prize is positive, suggesting that the subjects understand that when the 
disinvestment-prizes are greater, the interest costs of continuation are also greater. At the 
same time, it seems that framing also has some effect. The coefficient of negative-interest is 
negative and significant, suggesting that subjects are more likely to disinvest early in the 
compound-interest treatment than in the negative-interest treatment, perhaps because in the 
negative-interest treatment the disinvestment prizes are framed as decreasing over time and, 
consequently, the subjects in the negative-interest treatment are mislead to believe that disinvest-
ment becomes less profitable with every round played. 
To test the robustness of the results, we conducted several checks, adding variables that the 
literature suggests that are likely to have some effect on subjects' decisions. First, we add a 
trigger-prize variable to test whether, as suggested by real options theory, subjects are more 
likely to quit when the trigger prizes are high. The results are summarized in the second column 
of Table 5. 
As a second robustness check, we follow the suggestion by Loewenstein and Lerner (2003) 
that subjects often tend to make decisions by focusing on the worse or on the best outcome. 
We expect that subjects that use this heuristic will tend to quit when either the maximum or 
minimum prizes they can win will drop below a certain threshold. We therefore include in the 
regression a minimum-possible-payoff variable that receives the worst possible payoff in the 
11th round and maximum-possible-payoff variable that receives the best possible payoff. For 
example, in Figure 2, the minimum-possible-payoff is -600 points and the maximum-possible-
payoff is 3,000 points. The results are summarized in the third column of Table 5. 
Summarizing the results of both robustness checks we find that whereas both trigger-prize
and minimum-possible-payoffs have significant effects on the probability of disinvestment, the 
inclusion of these variables does not affect, however, the significance of the risk-averse-
vigilant dummy. It therefore seems that there is some variance in the subjects' decision 
making process with some subjects making their disinvestment decision on the basis of the 
differences between the rounds' prizes and the trigger prizes and some basing their decisions 
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on a simplifying heuristic. However, controlling for the differences in the subjects' decision 
making process does not diminish the effect of the risk-averse-vigilant dummy. It therefore 
seems that although subjects differ in their decision making process, risk-averse-vigilant 
subjects seem to be more able than other subjects to disinvest early, either because they reach 
other conclusions than other subjects or because they are more able than other subjects to 
handle the stress of giving up on the opportunity to continue playing.  
4.3 Combined estimation: Rounds played and likelihood of skipping 
The results of the previous subsections suggest that risk-normal-vigilant subjects are more 
likely to skip games than all other subjects and that risk-averse-vigilant subjects tend to 
disinvest earlier than other subjects. In this subsection we therefore study the behavior of 
vigilant subjects further by using a Heckman two stage procedure to test the optimality of the 
subjects’ disinvestment decisions, contingent on their first stage decisions to invest.  
Thus, the dependent variable in the first stage is a play-game dummy that equals 1 if a subject 
played the game and 0 if he skipped it. The dependent variable in the second stage is a 
variable that measures the distance-from-optimality of the subjects’ decisions and which we 
define as follows. First, we define the decision to disinvest at the first round in which the 
round’s prize dropped below the trigger prize as the optimal decision. When a subject makes 
an optimal decision, we say that he played the optimal number of rounds. The distance-from-
optimality is, therefore, the difference between the number of rounds that a subject played and 
the optimal number of rounds.  
Figure 4. Example for a decision-situation faced by a subject  
(disinvesting in period 6 would be optimal) 
Source: own calculations 
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For example, figure 4 depicts the decisions made by a subject in a low-variance-low-first-
prize game. The thick line represents the prizes that the subject won in each round and the 
dashed line represents the trigger prizes. The subject would have made the optimal decision if 
he were to quit in the sixth round because the sixth round is the first round in which the 
round’s prize dropped below the trigger prize. The subject, however, played until the 10th
round. The subject’s distance-from-optimal was therefore 4610    rounds. We find that the 
average distance-from-optimal is 4.4 rounds and that this average is significantly greater than 
zero (t=23.1, p<0.01).
Table 6. Rounds played, conditional on investing in the investment stage 
 1 2 
 Play-game Absolute-difference Play-game Absolute-difference 
Risk-averse- 
vigilant 
-0.50 
(0.370) 
-0.86** 
(0.403) 
-0.50 
(0.370) 
-0.96* 
(0.593) 
Risk-normal- 
vigilant 
-0.709** 
(0.347) 
0.03 
(0.371) 
-0.709** 
(0.347) 
-0.07 
(0.543) 
Risk-averse- 
buck-passers 
-0.13 
(0.388) 
-0.03 
(0.390) 
-0.13 
(0.388) 
-0.05 
(0.580) 
Risk-normal- 
buck-passers 
-0.17 
(0.335) 
0.371 
(0.363) 
-0.17 
(0.335) 
0.32 
(0.537) 
Cost-of-playing -0.0002** 
(0.00008) 
0.003*** 
(0.0009) 
Disinvestment- 
prize 
-0.0001 
(-0.00008) 
-0.0001 
(0.00008) 
Difference between 
disinvestment-prize 
and cost-of-playing 
-0.00009 
(0.00009) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.00007) 
Variance 0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.00003 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.00003 
(0.0005) 
First-prize 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.0007) 
-0.002** 
(0.0009) 
Negative- 
treatment 
 0.083 
(0.431) 
 0.275 
(0.617) 
Age -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.04 
(0.032) 
Men -0.51* 
(0.294) 
-0.12 
(0.307) 
-0.51* 
(0.294) 
-0.19 
(0.452) 
Student -0.49 
(0.431) 
0.01 
(0.397) 
-0.49 
(0.431) 
-0.01 
(0.590) 
German-born -0.20 
(0.307) 
0.04* 
(0.022) 
-0.20 
(0.307) 
Skip-optimal -1.32* 
(0.727) 
Constant 4.724*** 
(1.41) 
4.25*** 
(1.278) 
4.724*** 
(1.41) 
5.19*** 
(1.68) 
Observations 510 510 
Ȥ2 63.5*** 33.5*** 
*- p<0.10 **- p<0.05 ***- p<0.01
Source: own calculations 
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To test the differences between vigilant, buck-passing, risk-averse and risk-normal subjects, 
we include in both stages of the estimation dummies for risk-averse-vigilant subjects, risk-
normal-vigilant subjects, risk-averse-buck-passers and risk-normal-buck-passers. As further 
controls we include cost-of-playing, disinvestment-prize, first-prize, variance and negative-
treatment, age, man, student and German-born. Column 1 in Table 6 summarizes the results 
for the first stage of the estimation and Column 2 summarizes the results for the second stage. 
As above, we find that the effect of being a risk-normal-vigilant subject on the probability that 
a subject will play a game is negative and significant. The likelihood, for example, that a risk-
normal-vigilant 28.7 years old male student that was born in Germany will skip a compound-
interest low-variance-low-first-prize game is 8.5%. If this subject becomes either not-vigilant 
or risk-averse, the likelihood he skips the game drops by 78% to 1.9%. When risk-normal 
vigilant subjects chose to play a game, however, the statistically insignificant coefficient of 
risk-normal-vigilant reported in Column 2 suggests that risk-normal vigilant subjects did not 
play more optimally than other subjects. The results therefore suggest again that risk-normal 
vigilant subjects are more likely than other subjects to skip games because they expect that if 
they will play they will not play optimally and they are also more able than other subjects to 
efficiently handle the stress of giving up on the opportunity to play. 
At the same time, the negative and significant coefficient of risk-averse-vigilant subjects in 
the distance-from-optimal column suggests that conditional on their decision to play, the 
disinvestment decisions of risk-averse-vigilant subjects tended to be closer to the optimal 
decision than the disinvestment decisions of other subjects. For example, in a compound-
interest low-variance-low-first-prize games, the expected distance-from-optimal of a 28.7 years 
old male student that was born in Germany is 3.9. If this subject was a risk-averse-vigilant 
subject, his distance-from-optimal would decrease by 21.6% to 3.1 rounds. The results 
therefore suggest that risk-averse-vigilant subjects played fewer rounds than other subjects 
because they played more optimally than other subjects and not because they preferred to play 
shorter rather than longer games.  
Thus, the results strengthen the finding that in the settings of our experiment, a combination 
of vigilance and risk-aversion is a necessary condition for optimal decision making. It seems 
that subjects that have both these traits are able to efficiently process the information that they 
receive in every round and that they are also able to execute a disinvestment decision without 
hesitating very long. It seems that most other subjects, on the other hand, either do not 
efficiently process all the information that they receive in every round or that they often 
hesitate for several rounds before executing a disinvestment decision. 
To test the robustness of these results we conducted a robustness test by adding to the first 
stage regression a skip-optimal dummy that equals 1 if the game is a losing game and 0 other-
wise. In addition, we replace the cost-of-playing and disinvestment-prize variables by the 
difference between the quit prize and the cost because including skip-optimal together with 
both cost-of-playing and disinvestment-prize causes a multi-collinearity problem. 
We find that the coefficient of skip-optimal is negative and significant, suggesting that all 
subjects are more likely to skip losing games than other games. Including skip-optimal in the 
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regression does not affect, however, the significance of the coefficient of the risk-normal-
vigilant dummy. Thus, the finding that risk-normal vigilant subjects are more likely to skip 
games than other subjects seems to be a general phenomenon and not one that depends on 
greater likelihood to skip losing trials. 
4.4 Payoffs 
The results of the previous subsections suggest that risk-averse vigilant subjects play more 
efficiently than other subjects but we do not find that subjects with high scores of buck-
passing play less efficiently than other subjects, although it seems likely that buck-passers 
will tend to continue playing even when other subjects disinvest (Mann et al., 1997). 
However, it is possible that this result is partly because the games lasted only up to 11 rounds 
and, therefore, the difference between the number of rounds played by buck-passers and the 
number of rounds played by other subjects was bounded. If there are differences between the 
abilities of buck-passers and other subjects to handle the stress of disinvestment decision, 
however, then it is possible that buck-passers will make smaller profits than other subjects 
because they will not disinvest even when the loses from continuing to play are great enough 
to make other subjects disinvest. 
We therefore estimated a random effects regression on the subjects’ payoffs in each game. 
The dependent variable is the subjects’ profits in each game and the independent variables are 
the same as in the previous subsection. The results are summarized in Table 7. 
We find that although risk-averse vigilant subjects seem to earn greater payoffs than other 
subjects, the differences between their profits and the profits of the other subjects are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of making suboptimal decisions on the 
payoffs is usually relatively small, perhaps because the maximum number of rounds is only 
11 or because the variance in half of the games was only 200 points.6 At the same time, the 
results suggest that risk-normal buck-passers tend to earn significantly smaller payoffs than 
all the other subjects. For example, in 11 of the games that they played, risk-normal buck-
passers even earned negative payoffs, whereas all other subjects did not earn negative payoffs 
in even a single game. Thus, it seems that risk-normal buck-passers play significantly less 
efficiently than other subjects, either because they process the information less efficiently or 
because the stress that they feel prevents them from executing a disinvestment decision even 
when they realize that disinvesting is more profitable than continue playing.
                                                          
6  LR test does not reject the null that the payoffs of risk-averse vigilant subjects, risk-normal vigilant subjects 
and risk-averse buck-passers are statistically the same. The Ȥ2= 0.28 (p>0.10). 
When the stress of quitting meets the cost of playing 23
SiAg-Working Paper 13 (2012); HU Berlin
Table 7. Subjects’ payoffs 
Variables Coefficients
Risk-averse-vigilant 29.17 
(1570.558) 
Risk-normal-vigilant -793.19 
(1422.559) 
Risk-averse-buck-passers -476.88 
(1634.303 
Risk-normal-buck-passers -3256.31** 
(1505.023) 
Cost-of-playing 0.20 
(0.339) 
Disinvestment-prize 2.18*** 
(0.339) 
Variance 3.30** 
(1.418) 
First rounds’ prize -2.48 
(4.799) 
Age -96.90 
(90.377) 
Negative-treatment -87.96 
(1192.682) 
Men 951.95 
(1199.554) 
Student -2798.13* 
(1599.797) 
German-born -1328.38 
(1526.236). 
Constant 19,929.79*** 
(5237.441) 
Observations 492 
Ȥ2 108.64*** 
*- p<0.10 **- p<0.05 ***- p<0.01
Source: own calculations  
5 Conclusion 
The conflict theory of decision making suggests that making decisions is stressful because 
choosing one alternative implies giving up on the other alternatives (Janis and Mann, 1977, 
Mann et al., 1997, Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Janis and Mann (1977) suggest some subjects 
will be able to handle this stress efficiently, but many others will delegate their decision to a 
later period or to another decision maker. The first type of subjects is known as vigilant and 
the second as buck-passers.
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We conducted an experiment that is composed of an investment stage followed by a game that 
lasts until the subjects decide to disinvest. The game stage, which is based on Sandri et al. 
(2010) is played only by subjects that chose to invest in the first stage. We find that subjects 
that had high scores of both risk-aversion and vigilance tended to make more efficient 
decisions than all other subjects, suggesting that these subjects are more efficient than other 
subjects in both processing information and in executing disinvestment decisions. Subjects 
that had high scores of vigilance and average or lower scores of risk-aversion were more 
likely than all other subjects to skip games, but when they chose to play they usually played 
as many rounds as all other subjects. It therefore seems that these risk-normal vigilant subjects 
have often predicted correctly that they will not play efficiently and, therefore, they chose to 
skip games more often than other subjects. All other subjects, and especially subjects that had 
high scores of buck-passing and average or low scores of risk-aversion, tended to invest in the 
first stage and then played an inefficiently large number of rounds. It seems, therefore, that 
most subjects, and especially subjects that had high scores of buck-passing and average or low 
scores of risk-aversion, are less efficient than vigilant subjects in handling the stress of 
disinvesting and, consequently, they often play a greater number of rounds and earn smaller 
profits than risk-averse vigilant subjects. 
Although we focus on studying vigilance and buck-passing, we nevertheless feel that, given 
the correlation between buck-passing and procrastination in many real-life scenarios, our 
results may somewhat contribute to giving psychological interpretation to O’Donoghue and 
Rabin’s (2001) model of procrastination (Mann et al., 1997). O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) 
suggest that there are three types of subjects: rational, sophisticated-naïve and naïve. Our 
findings suggest that rational subjects are those that have high scores of both vigilance and 
risk-aversion. Sophisticated-naives are subjects that have high scores of vigilance but low 
scores of risk-aversion. Other subjects seem to behave like naïve subjects in O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (2001). In addition, Subjects that have high scores of buck-passing and low scores of 
risk-aversion, seem to be even worse than other subjects in their naivety and, consequently, 
they postpone their decisions even when the costs are such that all other subjects are inclined 
to a make a decision (Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2004, Grenadier and Wang, 2007). 
Our results therefore suggest that buck-passing, vigilance and procrastination can contribute 
to the understanding of psychological motives in economic decisions. As such, the results 
suggest that further study can contribute to better predictions on intertemporal decisions, such 
as decisions about saving, investment, health, housings and other similar decisions (Madrian 
and Shea, 2001, Gul and Pesendorfer, 2004, Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2004, Grenadier 
and Wang, 2007, Harris, 2010).  
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